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FIGHTING THE FTCA: MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, VETERANS, AND THE VA
Taylor C. Spillers*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Never in my career have I encountered an individual with
that many [medical] errors and misdiagnoses.” – Margie Scott,
MD1
Dr. Levy, who served as the Chief of Pathology at the
Fayetteville Veterans Health Care System of the Ozarks
(“Fayetteville VA”) from 2005 to 2018, diagnosed veterans with
an error rate of 10%.2 The “pathology practice average is 0.7%.”3
Of the more than 3,000 cases Dr. Levy misdiagnosed, 589 were
classified as “Level 3 (major) errors” which should always
“trigger an [internal] investigation.”4
Unfortunately, no
investigations ensued until Dr. Levy’s ultimate arrest, although
the Fayetteville VA addressed Dr. Levy’s behavior repeatedly
throughout his employment.
In 2015, the Fayetteville VA received numerous complaints
accusing Dr. Levy of drinking on the job, all of which he denied.5
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. Editor-in-Chief of the
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author sincerely thanks Dr. Frankie Griffin for his
insight into the medical profession and guidance throughout the writing process. The author
also gives a special thank you to Monte Sharits as the initial inspiration behind this Comment.
Lastly, the author thanks the Arkansas Law Review for their commitment to diligent editing;
and her mother, father, and brother for their constant encouragement and support.
1. Ninette Sosa & Garrett Fergeson, Former VA Pathologist Sentencing Continues into
2nd Day, KNWA FOX24 (Jan. 21, 2021), [https://perma.cc/T8GL-ULNU] (Dr. Margie Scott
is the Medical Center Director at the Central Arkansas Veterans Healthcare System).
2. Id.
3. Doug Thompson, Hidden Errors of Doctor Told in Courtroom, ARK. DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE (Jan. 22, 2021), [https://perma.cc/R7PB-Y6QZ].
4. For context, the VA conducted a nationwide review around 1990 and found just 100
Level 3 errors total. Dr. Levy had 589 in just thirteen years. Sosa & Fergeson, supra note
1.
5. Id.
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In 2016, the Fayetteville VA caught Dr. Levy actively practicing
medicine with a blood alcohol level of 0.39 and temporarily
suspended him.6 Dr. Levy was allowed to resume his position as
the Chief of Pathology and maintain his annual salary of $225,000
after completing three months of rehab, swearing to abstain from
intoxicating substances, and agreeing to random drug and alcohol
testing.7 For the next two years, Dr. Levy ingested a chemical
known as “2-methyl-2-butanol” to achieve a drunken state while
going undetected on forty different urine and blood samples he
submitted during that time.8 The Fayetteville VA finally fired Dr.
Levy in 2018 after he was arrested for driving under the influence,
and an investigation into his former patients began.9 Dr. Levy
took an oath as a physician “to do no harm” but ultimately told
hundreds of veterans they had cancer when they did not, or that
they did not have cancer when, in fact, they did.10 He also
actively concealed his mistakes by falsifying medical records to
appear as though another pathologist agreed with his diagnoses.11
Dr. Levy’s case is just one example, although a particularly
egregious example, of medical malpractice in the United States,
and more specifically, at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(the “VA”).12 According to the National Practitioner Data Bank,
roughly 11,000 to 13,000 medical malpractice payments are made
every year nationally.13 412 of those payments were made on
behalf of VA providers in 2019.14 Across the board, actual
medical malpractice numbers are significantly higher considering
95% of legitimate malpractice victims do not have “meaningful
access to the civil justice system . . . unless their damages are
significantly larger than [normal],” and many victims simply
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Sosa & Fergeson, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The term “VA” is used to encompass the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, in
general, rather than one specific administration within the Department. See generally About
VA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., [https://perma.cc/65BG-764C] (Apr. 6, 2021).
13. Data Analysis Tool, NAT’L PRAC. DATA BANK, [https://perma.cc/PD8J-58W6].
(last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (data represents the year of payment, not the year the malpractice
occurred).
14. See infra Appendix I.
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choose not to file lawsuits.15 For instance, while approximately
1% of hospital patients are injured by malpractice each year,
fewer than 2% of those injured will file claims.16 Studies also
show that “the poor and elderly are [even] less likely to sue,”
which, demographically speaking, encompasses many veterans.17
When veterans do bring medical malpractice claims,18
however, they find themselves in starkly different legal situations
compared to non-veterans (“civilians”).19 Rather than file a
typical medical malpractice lawsuit in state court against the
provider or institution directly responsible for the harm, veterans
can only sue the United States of America through the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).20 This Article argues that the FTCA
should not provide immunity to medical professionals at the VA
because it significantly limits veterans’ access to attorneys, to
courts, and to damage awards. Part I introduces the FTCA and
explores the juxtaposition between civilians and veterans injured
by medical malpractice. Part II demonstrates why the FTCA is
not only a less favorable option for veterans but one that places
veterans at a significant disadvantage compared to civilians. Part
III argues that shielding medical professionals from individual
liability under the FTCA ultimately harms the reputation of the
VA and the providers who deliver quality and competent care to
veterans. With recent (and longstanding) calls for change at the
VA, removing the FTCA and its immunity in medical malpractice
lawsuits is a necessary step towards giving veterans the care they
deserve.

15. See Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical
Liability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 154 (2014).
16. Id. at 153.
17. William B. Weeks et al., Tort Claims Analysis in the Veterans Health
Administration for Quality Improvement, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 335, 340 (2001).
18. For clarification, this is only true if the alleged medical malpractice occurred at a
VA medical center and/or at the hands of a medical practitioner employed by the Federal
Government. The FTCA does not apply to veterans who are injured by medical malpractice
at a privately owned and operated hospital or medical facility and/or a medical practitioner
in private practice. See KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 7-8 (2019), [https://perma.cc/5FSD-4WKE].
19. The term “civilian” is used throughout this article only to distinguish between
veterans and non-veterans.
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7316.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Department of Veterans Affairs Overview
There are currently more than nineteen million veterans in
the United States who courageously served in the U.S. Army,
Navy, or Air Force.21 As compensation for their service, veterans
are entitled to free healthcare benefits through the VA.22 More
than nine million of those former servicemen and women utilize
and rely on the VA Health Care System today.23 Although free
for veterans, the VA is publicly funded.24 In the 2019 fiscal year
alone, more than eighty billion taxpayer dollars went toward
funding veterans’ medical care.25
As America’s largest integrated health care system with
1,454 health care facilities, including 171 VA medical centers and
1,283 outpatient sites across the United States, the VA is a
veteran’s one-stop-shop for medical, dental, and vision care. 26
Given the magnitude of services it provides, the VA employs
more than 367,200 full-time health care professionals and support
staff and serves as the “nation’s largest provider of graduate
medical education” by partnering with academic institutions to
provide nearly 117,000 residency, fellowship, and training
positions.27 In addition to directly hiring providers, the VA also
independently contracts with a range of health care

21. Department of Veterans Affairs Statistics at a Glance, NAT’L CTR. FOR VETERANS
ANALYSIS & STATS., [https://perma.cc/ZTT3-237R] (Dec. 31, 2019) [hereinafter Statistics
at a Glance]. For purposes of these statistics, Marines are included in the Department of the
Navy.
22. See Eligibility for VA Health Care, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
[https://perma.cc/H5GB-S43Y] (Sept. 17, 2020).
23. Statistics at a Glance, supra note 21.
24. See Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: How Much Does the Federal
Government Spend on Health Care?, TAX POL’Y CTR., [https://perma.cc/7D6B-826J] (May
2020).
25. Id.
See also About VHA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
[https://perma.cc/Y3M9-GP8M] (Apr. 9, 2021) (The health care system has an “annual
budget of approximately $68 billion.”).
26. About VHA, supra note 25. These numbers are constantly changing as the VA
expands and contracts. These figures are current as of April 9, 2021.
27. Id. The VA also has more than 46,000 active volunteers and 15,000 affiliated
medical faculty. Id. These numbers are constantly changing as the VA expands and
contracts. These figures are current as of April 9, 2021.
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professionals.28 Unlike civilian patients who select their doctors,
veterans are not afforded the right to choose their medical
providers at the VA.29 Instead, veterans are assigned to a
healthcare team at a specific VA location.30
B. FTCA Overview
In theory, every individual practicing medicine is susceptible
to medical malpractice. Roughly 99% of physicians in high-risk
specialties and 75% of those in low-risk specialties face a medical
malpractice claim by the age of 65.31 However, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity protects healthcare providers32 employed by
the VA—given their status as federal employees.33 Therefore,
they cannot be sued in their individual capacity for medical
malpractice even when they commit blatant wrongdoing, like Dr.
Levy.34 Instead, the government assumes liability on their behalf
under the FTCA.35 Therefore, when a veteran is harmed by the
tortious conduct of a VA employee, the veteran’s only legal
course of action is to sue the United States of America under the
FTCA rather than file a typical medical malpractice lawsuit
against the individuals or institutions responsible for the harm.36

28. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 8-9.
29. Your VA Primary Care Provider and PACT Team, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFS., [https://perma.cc/XM72-HEAM] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
30. Id. (A veteran’s health care team includes a primary care provider, clinical
pharmacist, registered nurse, and licensed practical nurse or medical assistant and clerk).
31. Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365
NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE, 629, 629 (2011).
32. Under the FTCA, a healthcare provider is “a physician, dentist, podiatrist,
chiropractor, optometrist, nurse, physician assistant, expanded-function dental auxiliary,
pharmacist, or paramedical (such as medical and dental technicians, nursing assistants, and
therapists), or other supporting personnel.” 38 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(2).
33. See 20 REASONS DOCTORS LIKE WORKING FOR THE VETERANS HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION 27 (2016), [https://perma.cc/RL6B-XGDL] [hereinafter 20 REASONS].
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In order for the FTCA to cover VA employees, they must
be “acting within the scope of [their] office or employment[,]” meaning they were hired to
perform the act in question or were promoting the employer’s interest at the time they acted.
LEWIS, supra note 18, at 11-12.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(1) (“[D]amages for personal injury, including death,
allegedly arising from malpractice or negligence of a health care employee of the
Administration in furnishing health care or treatment while in the exercise of that employee’s
duties in or for the Administration shall be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding
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1. Purpose and Function of the FTCA
Before the FTCA’s enactment in 1946, a victim injured by a
tortious government employee could only recover by asking
“Congress to enact private legislation affording them relief[.]”37
Unsurprisingly, private legislation was rarely granted.38 To
combat this problem and provide victims with a more practical
means of compensation, Congress created the FTCA and shifted
the burden of deciding complicated tort claims from Congress to
the courts.39 Along with its “compensatory purpose, the FTCA
also aims to ‘deter tortious conduct by federal personnel’ by
rendering the United States liable for the torts of its agents[.]” 40
Congress hoped that this would “incentiviz[e] the government to
carefully supervise its employees.”41 While the FTCA is an
expansive and comprehensive statute, this Article focuses only on
the FTCA in the context of medical malpractice at the VA.
Proponents of the FTCA, including Congress, recognize the
FTCA’s limitations.42 They argue, however, that veterans should
generally prefer to sue the government (under the FTCA) rather
than the individual physician (under a civilian medical
malpractice claim) because the government has deeper pockets
than the physician.43 In particular, every payment made by the
government comes from a “permanent and indefinite

by reason of the same subject matter against the health care employee (or employee’s estate)
whose act or omission gave rise to such claim.”).
37. See LEWIS, supra note 18, at 4.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 5-6.
40. Id. (quoting Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
41. Id.
42. See Thomas K. Kruppstadt, Determining Whether a Physician is a United States
Employee or an Independent Contractor in a Medical Malpractice Action Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 223, 225-26 (1995) (“Occasionally [it is within] the
plaintiff’s best interest . . . to argue that the government physician is an independent
contractor . . . if [they] prefer[] a jury trial, a state court, or a state statute of limitations that
is longer than the two year federal statute of limitations [imposed under the FTCA].”).
43. See Christa L. Britton, Torts: Anderson v. Eichner — Although Faculty Physicians,
Resident Physicians, and Interns Face Private Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice, the
State is Immune, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 537, 547 (1996); see also Kruppstadt, supra note 42, at
224-25.
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appropriation” known as the Judgment Fund (the “Fund”).44
Congress created the Fund in 1956 to eliminate the need for
Congress to determine, settle, and allocate appropriations for each
claim brought against the United States.45 “Originally, the Fund
was available only for judgments . . . less than $100,000,” which
Congress believed would cover 98% of claims.46 However, this
proved to be a grossly inaccurate estimate as judgments
skyrocketed by the mid-1970s.47 Since that time, the Fund no
longer has a monetary cap and awards of any amount may be
appropriated, including attorneys’ fees, post-judgment interest,
court fees, and compensation for court-appointed experts.48
Nevertheless, most Americans know little to nothing about
the Fund or its sizable payments.49 In 2019, the Fund allocated
more than $100,000,000 solely to victims of medical malpractice
at the VA.50 Notably, the Fund makes payments of this
magnitude every year on behalf of negligent VA providers.
Figure 1 represents the allocation of funds, both at the
administrative level and the court level, from 2005 to 2020.51
Figure 1

44. VIVIAN S. CHU & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42835, THE JUDGMENT
FUND:
HISTORY,
ADMINISTRATION,
AND
COMMON
USAGE
3
(2013),
[https://perma.cc/NM3X-XUZN] [hereinafter CRS JUDGMENT FUND].
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. Id. at 4.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 8-9 (describing costs allowable under awards paid from the Fund,
including other costs approved under 28 U.S.C. §1920, such as transcripts, fees related to
witnesses, materials for presentation in the case, and docket fees).
49. See Sen. Deb Fischer & Sen. Cory Gardner, Senators Fischer and Gardner: Obama
Administration Is Irresponsible and Risky with Judgment Fund, TIME (Oct. 13, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/Z4QY-CLBX] (explaining that the Senators “introduced the Judgment
Fund Transparency Act . . . to see how taxpayer dollars are spent”).
50. See infra Figure 1.
51. Judgment Fund Payment Search, BUREAU FISCAL SERV., [https://perma.cc/Q374LPNV] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). Search results from January 1 to December 31 each
year. Required Search Field refined to Department of Veteran Affairs. Optional Search
Fields refined as follows: (1) Type: Principal; (2) Code and Description: 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)
Med Mal; 28 U.S.C. 2677 Med Mal; and 28 U.S.C. 2672 Med Mal; (3) Payment Amount:
N/A Administrative payments represent settlements made at the administrative level.
Litigative payments represent payments made at the federal court level. See infra Appendix
I (listing the precise payments per calendar year).
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Judgment Fund Payments for Medical Malpractice at the VA
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Fund values only represent the monetary value of
settlements and judgments paid by the government to its victims
and do not encompass the total cost of medical malpractice paid
by the government.52 On top of Fund totals, the government also
pays to defend each medical malpractice claim.53 For instance,
the government pays roughly $11,300,000 per year to retain VA
defense attorneys.54 Unsurprisingly, the “Fund remains a source
of continued controversy and discussion . . . .”55

2. Mechanics of a FTCA Medical Malpractice Lawsuit
In practice, medical malpractice claims function much
differently under the FTCA than medical malpractice claims
brought by civilians against providers in their individual capacity.
While both veteran and civilian malpractice claims use the
52. See Judgment Fund, BUREAU FISCAL SERV., [https://perma.cc/NY7B-KV24] (last
visited Mar. 1, 2020).
53. See Weeks et al., supra note 17, at 340-43 (“[O]ther hidden costs—time when
providers are giving depositions, time when administrators are reviewing claims—make the
overall cost of tort claims [within the VA] much more substantial” than the reported Fund
numbers.).
54. Id. at 335, 343. Note that reported values are from 1989 to 2000 and could be
substantially higher today.
55. CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 44, at 1.
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substantive law of the state where the tortious conduct occurred,
the FTCA substantially changes the procedural law governing a
veteran’s claim. 56 The two major changes include whom to file
a lawsuit against and how.
a. Whom to File a Lawsuit Against under the FTCA
Civilians injured by medical malpractice may tailor their
lawsuit towards a multitude of defendants, including the tortious
provider, the hospital, and the insurance company that provides
malpractice insurance to the provider.57 Veterans injured by
medical malpractice have only one option: the United States of
America. Not only does the FTCA control who the defendant is,
but it also places many veterans in an uncomfortable position by
forcing them to sue the country they once honorably served.58
The only time a veteran can escape the FTCA and, instead, sue
the tortious provider through a typical, state malpractice claim is
when that provider happens to be an independent contractor to the
VA.59
Still, the distinction between employees and independent
contractors has not always been clear and has hindered many
veterans’ chances of recovery altogether. Veteran Brian Tally
serves as one example. Tally filed a claim under the FTCA after
his doctor—whom Tally believed to be a VA employee—failed
to discover a bone-eating staph infection in his spine.60 It took
the VA more than a year to inform Tally that his doctor was
actually an independent contractor.61 Not only was Tally’s
lawsuit against the United States dismissed at that point, but the

56. See TULLY RINCKEY, A GUIDE TO SUING THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 3-4 (2011), [https://perma.cc/MGH3-PCYJ]
[hereinafter GUIDE TO SUING THE VA].
57. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, What Is Accountability In Health
Care?, 124 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 229, 230 (1996).
58. Cf. James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons From the History
of Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135, 205 n.464 (2011)
(offering patriotism as a reason that many veterans of the Vietnam War were reluctant to sue
the U.S. government for health complications stemming from exposure to Agent Orange).
59. See LEWIS, supra note 18, at 9.
60. Leo Shane III, After a Years-long Fight, Veterans Will See New Medical
Malpractice Protections, MIL. TIMES. (Jan. 6, 2021), [https://perma.cc/H4V2-P2SX,/].
61. Id.
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statute of limitations had expired on a potential medical
malpractice lawsuit against the doctor.62 Tally was therefore left
without legal recourse.63 In response to Tally’s preventable
situation, legislators passed a bill in January 2021 mandating that
department officers “clearly identify the employment status of
any individuals involved in [a veteran’s] case within a month of a
veteran submitting a malpractice claim.”64 The remainder of this
Article assumes the tortfeasor was a VA employee.
b. How to File a Lawsuit under the FTCA
While civilians can make written demands or file
complaints in state court, veterans must submit an “administrative
claim” to the VA’s Regional Counsel (the “Agency”) before they
can file a lawsuit in federal court.65 This two-step procedure was
intended to “ease court congestion” and “provide fairness to
plaintiffs” by encouraging more settlements at the administrative
level “that would lead to less work for all [the parties]
involved.”66
Administrative claims are made by submitting a Standard
Form 95 (“SF-95”) to the Agency within two years of the claim’s
accrual.67 The SF-95 is a two-page, generic form that essentially
asks the veteran to divulge the basis of the claim, the nature and
extent of the injury, and the sum certain amount of the claim
before conducting formal discovery.68 The dollar amount written
here is an absolute limit on the amount sought and cannot be
raised at any point in the future unless a veteran shows “newly
discovered evidence [that was] not reasonably discoverable at the
time of presenting the [administrative] claim to the [Agency]

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Veterans Receive New Medical Malpractice Protections, A.B.A. (Jan.
29, 2021), [https://perma.cc/YQ9P-Q54S].
65. See GUIDE TO SUING THE VA, supra note 56, at 13-14.
66. Daniel Shane Read, The Courts’ Difficult Balancing Act to Be Fair to Both Plaintiff
and Government Under the FTCA’s Administrative Claims Process, 57 BAYLOR L. REV.
785, 791-92 (2005).
67. GUIDE TO SUING THE VA, supra note 56, at 13-14 (A claim accrues at “the time
the injury and its cause should have been discovered by a reasonable person.”).
68. See STANDARD FORM 95, [https://perma.cc/B8FX-SCV2].
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. . . .”69 After receiving the SF-95, the Agency has six months to
either settle or deny the claim.70 If the Agency denies the claim,
a veteran may appeal the decision once, giving the Agency
another six months to reevaluate the claim before making a final
determination.71
After submitting an administrative claim, there are three
situations that allow a veteran to file a formal lawsuit in federal
court: (1) the Agency denies the administrative claim, either
initially or on appeal; (2) the Agency offers a settlement amount
that the veteran believes is insufficient; or (3) the Agency does
not respond to the administrative claim within six months.72 If
the Agency denies the administrative claim (option 1), a veteran
only has six months to file a lawsuit in federal court before the
claim is “forever barred.”73 If a settlement or verdict is reached
at any point in the administrative or adjudicative process, monies
are taken from the Fund, given to the veteran, and the case is
closed.74
III. FTCA CREATES LIMITATIONS ON VETERANS’
MALPRACTICE OPTIONS
The FTCA not only changes the who and how of medical
malpractice, but it also takes away certain legal rights that
civilians in state malpractice claims otherwise enjoy. The FTCA
is not only a less favorable option for veterans but also an unfair
option because it limits their access to attorneys, courts, and
damage awards.
A. Limited Access to Attorneys
Medical malpractice is already a complex area of law and
practiced by few attorneys.75 Most attorneys avoid medical
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b).
70. See GUIDE TO SUING THE VA, supra note 56, at 18-19.
71. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b) (2021).
72. GUIDE TO SUING THE VA, supra note 56, at 3.
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
74. See CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 44, at 6.
75. See e.g., Stephen Daniel & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, Specialization, and
Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1060-61 (2006).
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malpractice lawsuits because they are “complex, risky, and
expensive to prepare” in relation to the average personal injury
case.76 One study on the caseload composition of 541 plaintiffs’
attorneys in Texas showed that more than half of the attorneys,
54.4%, did not handle a single medical malpractice case for this
reason.77 Of the attorneys “who handled at least one malpractice
matter . . . the median percentage of their business made up by
malpractice [was only] 10 percent[.]”78 Attorneys reported that
they would rather diversify their case composition to avoid the
risk of losing all the money spent preparing a medical malpractice
case if the case was ultimately lost.79 Only 46 of the 541 attorneys
devoted 50% or more of their business to medical malpractice.80
Like all lawsuits, obtaining legal representation is crucial.
For instance, represented veterans often recover twice as much as
those who submit their claims without the help of an attorney.81
Unfortunately, however, the FTCA adds an additional layer of
confusion and difficulty to medical malpractice claims, making a
veteran’s case even less appealing to an already small number of
attorneys willing to try medical malpractice cases. Attorneys,
themselves, describe lawsuits under the FTCA as “trickier than
suing a private citizen”82 and “unduly confusing and complex
without the guidance of an attorney [who has] particular
experience in filing malpractice claims on behalf of veterans.”83
The most deterring aspect of a veteran’s case, however, is the
FTCA’s cap on attorneys’ fees.

76. Id. at 1061 (A lawyer who only handles a minimal amount of medical malpractice
cases noted, “[M]alpractice cases are really expensive to develop . . . [A]nyone can take a
car wreck case and try it, but for the medical malpractice cases you’ve got to know more
about the medicine.”).
77. Id. at 1060.
78. Id. at 1061.
79. Id. at 1060-61 (one lawyer reported losing $50,000 on just one case).
80. Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1061.
81. Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospital Medical Malpractice, NAT’L TRIAL L.,
[https://perma.cc/DX3Z-9UYJ].
82. David Goguen, Suing the Government for Negligence: The Federal Tort Claims
Act, NOLO, [https://perma.cc/QV2J-Z5DK] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021) (“[Y]ou will have to
jump through a number of hoops, and the lawsuits are subject to a lengthy and sometimes
confusing list of limitations.”).
83. VA Malpractice Attorneys in Orange County, HODES MILMAN, LLP,
[https://perma.cc/8CUH-VCEY] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
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1. FTCA Cap on Attorneys’ Fees
Under the FTCA, if the government settles the case at the
administrative level (that is, after a SF-95 form is filed with the
Agency but before a lawsuit is filed in federal court), an attorney
is only entitled to 20% of the settlement award.84 If, on the other
hand, a veteran prevails later in federal court, the attorney is
entitled to 25% of the award.85 These percentages are extremely
low for medical malpractice cases. Contingency fees in civilian
cases range from 33% to 40% on average,86 and studies
demonstrate that capping this fee makes it less likely an attorney
will try the case.87 Although 33% to 44% contingency fees can
portray medical malpractice attorneys as “greedy, opportunistic
lawyer[s]” that take even the weakest cases simply to profit off
the “extravagant amounts” awarded, high contingency fees
coupled with high damage awards are necessary to offset the high
cost of litigation.88 Lawyers frequently decline to take even the
most obvious malpractice cases when the potential damages do
not offset the costs associated with taking the case.89 Moreover,
the judicial system has various safety nets in place to discourage
attorneys from filing frivolous lawsuits.90

84. 28 U.S.C § 2678.
85. 28 U.S.C § 2678.
86. Shepherd, supra note 15, at 166.
87. Steven Garber et al., Do Noneconomic Damages Caps and Attorney Fee Limits
Reduce Access to Justice for Victims of Medical Negligence?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
637, 681 (2009) (study demonstrating that attorneys are less likely to take meritorious
medical malpractice cases when noneconomic damage caps and attorney fees limits would
reduce attorney fees); cf. Shephard, supra note 15, at 155 (explaining that many “damagerestricting tort reforms have [already] made it economically infeasible for attorneys to take
many medical malpractice cases.”).
88. See Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1052.
89. See Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1064 (associated costs include screening,
preparing, litigating, billable hours, referral costs, and other overheads); see also A. Russell
Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events due to Negligence:
Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991)
(“Trial lawyers usually accept only the relatively few cases that have a high probability of
resulting in a judgment of negligence with an award large enough to defray the high costs of
litigation.”).
90. Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False
Premises Behind “Tort Reform”, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 357, 359 (2005)
(“[T]he contingency fee arrangement[, itself,] . . . screens out baseless lawsuits.”); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (possible sanctions imposed for filing baseless claims).
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A single medical malpractice case can take up to $500,000
merely to litigate, with the average just below $100,000.91 For
comparison, the median litigation cost for an automobile tort case
is $43,000.92 Real property cases typically cost $66,000 to litigate
and contract cases average around $91,000 in litigation
expenses.93 Medical malpractice cases cost substantially more
because attorneys must interpret the law and the medicine.94 For
instance, medical malpractice lawyers report spending $10,000
on experts simply to determine whether to take the case initially.95
While “specialists” in the field often hire “nurse-lawyers” or
“physician-lawyers” to “internalize some of [these] important
expert costs[,]” many attorneys do not have this luxury.96 Instead,
they must hire medical experts to ensure their cases are
adequately screened and litigated.97 Of course, the more
specialized the expert, the more expensive the hourly billing.98
For example, experts in emergency medicine bill at a national
average rate of $381 per hour to review a case, whereas, experts
in neurosurgery bill at $741 per hour.99 Calling medical experts
at trial is even pricier, at $494 per hour for emergency medicine
and $1,134 per hour for neurosurgery.100
Along with expert costs, malpractice attorneys themselves
expend sizable hours on each case.101 Specifically, 472 average
billable hours per case if it “progress[es] all [the] way through
trial and post-disposition proceedings.”102 In contrast, attorneys
91. Shepherd, supra note 15, at 165-66 (at the very least, attorneys expect to spend
$50,000).
92. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation,
20 CT. STAT. PROJECT 1, 7 (2013), [https://perma.cc/69P3-DUCM].
93. Id.
94. See Shepherd, supra note 15, at 165; see also Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at
1061.
95. Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1063-64.
96. Id. at 1062. Attorneys were considered “specialists” if “[medical] malpractice
comprised 50 percent or more of their business.” Id. at 1061.
97. Id. at 1062.
98. See Expert Witness Fee Calculator, EXPERT INST., [https://perma.cc/JF49-Z9LT]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Hannaford-Agor & Waters, supra note 92, at 6.
102. Id. Cf. Anupam B. Jena et al., Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation
Against US Physicians, 172 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 892, 893 (2012) (reporting that
it takes thirty-nine to forty-three months to reach a verdict in court).
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only expend 196 billable hours on automobile cases from start to
finish, 284 hours on real property cases, and 367 hours on contract
cases.103
All in all, plaintiffs’ attorneys are not reimbursed for these
expenses, if at all, until the case is closed. Typically, attorneys
will pay the litigation costs if they lose the case.104 If they win
the case, the plaintiff will usually pay for the litigation costs in
addition to the agreed upon contingency fee.105 Since “attorneys
bear the risk of paying the litigation costs if a case loses,
contingen[cy] fee arrangements require attorneys to evaluate
cases in terms of the risks and potential returns of the case.”106
Consider the associated risk of each contingency fee agreement
when an attorney spends $50,000 litigating a case worth only
$150,000 in damages:
(1) In a civilian case, an attorney working at a 33%
contingency fee “risk[s] the same amount he
stands to earn; he pays $50,000 in litigation costs
if he loses the case, and he earns a $50,000
contingen[cy] fee if he wins the case.”107
(2) An attorney working at a 20% contingency fee
at the administrative level under the FTCA pays
$50,000 in litigation costs if he loses the case and
earns $30,000 if he settles the case.
(3) An attorney working at a 25% contingency fee
at the court level under the FTCA pays $50,000 in
litigation costs if he loses the case and earns
$37,500 if he wins the case.
Under the FTCA, the attorney risks losing more than he stands to
earn at both the administrative level and at the court level.
Therefore, an attorney would surely deny this case at the
screening stage. Veterans need higher potential damages to offset
the FTCA’s low attorneys’ fees in order to make their cases
economically feasible for attorneys. This is a considerable burden
to overcome given most lawyers rarely accept a case with
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Hannaford-Agor & Waters, supra note 92, at 6.
Shepherd, supra note 15, at 166.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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potential damages below $100,000, while some take nothing
below $1,000,000, working at contingency fees of 33% or
more.108
B. Limited Access to the Court System
“The right to sue and defend in [American] courts is . . .
one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship
. . . .” 109 Even noncitizens are afforded access to American courts
when they are injured on U.S. soil.110 So why then are veterans
treated differently?
1. Administrative Claim Hurdle
To reach federal court, a veteran must first exhaust their
administrative remedies. While the administrative process was
designed to “lead to less work for all [parties] involved[,]” it
forces veterans to file an administrative claim, potentially wait a
year, and then file a lawsuit in federal court.111 Civilians, on the
other hand, file only one lawsuit directly with the court.
The administrative claims process does not encourage
adequate and appropriate settlements for every meritorious claim
as Congress intended. 14.6% of claims (1,610 claims) filed at the
VA from 1989 to 2000 were only settled after veterans exhausted
their administrative remedies and proceeded to federal court.112
Furthermore, Figure 1 demonstrates the sheer increase in
payments made at the court level compared to the administrative
level every year.113 Overall, the administrative claims process
functions as an obstacle for many valid claims. The Agency
generally takes 375 days (12.5 months) to deny administrative
claims and 444 days (14.8 months) to settle administrative

108. Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1065; see also Shepherd, supra note 15, at 154
(explaining that attorneys routinely reject 90% of incoming malpractice claims for
insufficient funds).
109. Chambers v. Baltimore, 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
110. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see generally 28 U.S.C § 1391 (venue
requirements).
111. Read, supra note 66, at 792.
112. Weeks et al., supra note 17, at 336.
113. Supra Figure 1; see also infra Appendix I (precise values).
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claims.114 Congress claims that these wait-times “ease court
congestion” by filtering out meritless lawsuits.115 However,
every claim that is denied at the administrative level, regardless
of its merit, can still be filed in federal court after the Agency
denies it. Therefore, the process more likely “ease[s] court
congestion” by disincentivizing the already small percentage of
medical malpractice victims who wish to seek legal recourse from
actually obtaining legal recourse.
2. No Jury Trial Allowed
Jury trials are considered a “fundamental constitutional
right” in the United States enjoyed by nearly every civilian
medical malpractice litigant.116 Jury trials are such a foundational
aspect of the American legal system that many state courts have
struck down entire laws as unconstitutional when they infringe on
a jury’s power to decide medical malpractice cases.117 Veterans,
however, are not given the right to a jury trial under the FTCA
(assuming their case reaches the trial stage) and, instead, must
undergo bench trials.118 In a bench trial, only one federal judge
decides the case in its entirety, including whether the case has
merit, and if so, how much compensation the veteran is entitled
to.119
Excluding the FTCA, bench trials are mandatory only in
cases of pure questions of law and equity, such as divorce, child
custody, permanent injunctions, and foreclosures—all much
different from the standard medical malpractice case.120 The
issue is not that bench trials are flawed per se. In fact, there are
certain circumstances where bench trials are preferred over jury
114. Weeks et al., supra note 17, at 336 (days from the time an administrative claim
was filed).
115. See Read, supra note 66, at 791.
116. B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United States, 467
CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS & RELATED RSCH. 339, 341 (2009), [https://perma.cc/V46V3VCE]; see Boehm, supra note 90, at 366; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[T]he right of
trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
117. See e.g., Boehm, supra note 90, at 366 n.45 (one example is damage caps).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2402.
119. See Trial by Jury May be a Better Choice Than a Bench Trial, HG.ORG,
[https://perma.cc/STL3-J8WY] (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).
120. Id.
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trials, such as criminal cases where the defendant’s appearance is
unfavorable or among unpopular parties like insurance
companies.121 Instead, the problem is that those litigants
strategically waived their right to a jury trial in favor of a bench
trial, whereas veterans are forced to forgo their right to a jury trial
regardless of their preferred trial strategy.
C. Limited Damage Awards
In addition to capping damage awards to the amount
written on the SF-95 filed before discovery takes place,122
veterans cannot receive punitive damages under the FTCA.123
Albeit punitive damages are not usually awarded in civilian
medical malpractice cases because doctor error is usually “simple
human mistake” and “truly accidental[,]” they are nonetheless
awarded when appropriate.124 Courts have found punitive
damages appropriate in civilian cases in instances “of gross
negligence and outrageous conduct by a health care
provider[.]”125 The exact standard of conduct warranting punitive
damages varies amongst jurisdictions, but usually involves
conduct categorized as “malfeasance, misfeasance, or
nonfeasance.”126
For example, in Gomez v. Cabatic, a New York court
awarded punitive damages to a civilian after an endocrinologist
destroyed original medical records to avoid liability in a wrongful
death suit involving her treatment of a child.127 The Tenth Circuit
also upheld an award of punitive damages in Macsenti v. Becker,
where a grossly impaired dentist passed out ten to fifteen times
while performing dental surgery, keeping the patient sedated for
ten long hours, and the patient suffered brain damage as a
121. Id.
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
124. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 415-16 (2005). But see 2 JOHN J. KIRCHER &
CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 17:4 (2d ed. 2020)
(“A significant number of cases in which punitive damages have been awarded against a
professional involve members of the medical profession . . . .”).
125. Sharkey, supra note 124, at 415.
126. KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 124.
127. Gomez v. Cabatic, 159 A.D.3d 62, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
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result.128 The court determined that these punitive damages were
awarded for their “proper function of punishing the offender and
deterring others so as to benefit society.”129
Seemingly similar conduct has occurred at various VA
establishments. For example, at the Fayetteville VA, Dr. Levy
tampered with medical records similar to the endocrinologist in
Gomez and was impaired like the dentist in Macsenti while
practicing medicine.130 Although Dr. Levy’s actions were just as
egregious and harmful as the doctors’ actions in the civilian cases,
punitive damages are off the table simply because a VA employee
caused the harm—another unfair FTCA nuance. This is despite
the fact that punitive damages and the FTCA share a similar goal:
punitive damages are awarded to “punish[] the offender and
deter[] others,” 131 and the FTCA is “aim[ed] to ‘deter tortious
conduct by federal personnel[.]’”132
IV. BENEFITS OF LETTING VETERANS ACCESS THE
CIVILIAN MALPRACTICE SYSTEM
As it currently stands, the FTCA draws a divide between
conduct and accountability. The FTCA is theoretically supposed
to deter tortious conduct by holding the United States responsible
for its employees’ actions,133 and the Fund is supposed to
“provide an end to the ‘hardship and injustice’” caused by
government employees.134 However, Americans persistently
criticize the VA and the quality of care it delivers despite the
128. Macsenti v. Becker, 237 F.3d 1223, 1242, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2001).
129. Id. at 1245.
130. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
131. Macsenti, 237 F.3d at 1245.
132. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 5-6; cf. Michael Frakes & Anupam B. Jena, Does
Medical Malpractice Law Improve Health Care Quality?, 143 J. PUB. ECON. 142 app. at 7
(2016) (citation omitted), [https://perma.cc/H3EH-6ZKB] (“Nonetheless, despite the
infrequent application of such awards, considering that punitive damages are generally not
insured by liability carriers, it remains reasonable to believe that physicians may be sensitive
to the threat posed by punitive awards.”).
133. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 5-6 (quoting Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935,
941 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
134. Bruce G. Hart, Jr., Medical Malpractice Protection Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act: Protecting Both Physicians and Claimants, 58 FORDHAM L. REV., 1107, 1110
n.19 (1990) (citing 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 65.01 at 3-3 to 3-4,
(1989)).
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Fund’s payouts. In 2017, Americans ranked the VA last in
popularity amongst ten similar federal agencies and departments,
including the IRS and United States Postal Service.135 Multiple
investigations and scandalous stories have surfaced in recent
years too, calling attention to numerous hiring and reporting
issues within the VA.136 Removing the FTCA from medical
malpractice lawsuits at the VA would benefit veterans from a
litigation standpoint by giving them the same legal rights as
civilians. It would also hold both VA providers and the VA
system accountable for medical malpractice which, in the long
haul, will improve veterans’ care.
Under the FTCA, VA employees are practically invisible
to the legal consequences of medical malpractice. Administrative
claims are mailed directly to the VA’s Regional Counsel, every
settlement and judgement is taken directly from the Fund, and
even “deposition[] [requests] by [a] claimant[‘s] counsel must be
approved and coordinated by VA legal staff” before a physician
partakes in any legal discussions.137 The VA also openly
advertises immunity as one of the top twenty reasons doctors like
working for the VA, stating in one hiring brochure:
Medical personnel have statutory immunity from
“individual” malpractice liability while acting within scope
of employment. A VA physician cannot be sued in civil court
for the malpractice (tort) claim. Providers feel less
threatened by the malpractice climate while working for the
government because if a patient sues a VA doctor, they are
instead are [sic] suing the federal government . . . . Separate
medical malpractice insurance is not required to be
maintained.138

Even when providers commit acts that would typically warrant
punitive damages in a civilian setting, they remain immune from

135. Kristen Bialik, The Changing Face of America’s Veteran Population, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Nov. 10, 2017), [https://perma.cc/8XYB-MEF8].
136. See, e.g., Donovan Slack, USA TODAY Investigation: VA Knowingly Hired
Doctors with Past Malpractice Claims, Discipline for Poor Care, USA TODAY (Dec. 13,
2017), [https://perma.cc/E3M3-MDQV]; Timeline: The Story Behind the VA Scandal, USA
TODAY (May 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/ZU7B-SEQ6] (Arizona VA scandal where records
were falsified to hide wait times).
137. 20 REASONS, supra note 33, at 27.
138. Id.
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liability.139 Despite their perpetual immunity under the FTCA for
medical negligence, medical professionals are still reported to the
National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”) whenever a medical
malpractice payment is made on their behalf.140 Reporting
requirements, therefore, subject the physician “to some degree of
professional accountability[.]”141 However, the VA has slipped
up on reporting and screening requirements in the past, meaning
negligent providers have sometimes faced no degree of
professional accountability.
Per VA policy, hiring personnel must run a query of the
NPDB before hiring an individual to ensure their “medical
licenses are current and in good standing[.]”142 However, shady
NPDB profiles “do[] not automatically disqualify a provider from
working at VA medical centers” since each VA has broad
discretion in the hiring process.143 Once a provider is hired, it is
the VA’s responsibility to monitor the NPDB for “new adverse
information about an existing provider” and address any other
concerns pertaining to a provider’s clinical care.144 VA officials
are required to report any serious concerns about a provider’s
clinical care to state licensing boards.145 This gives state licensing
boards the ability to “investigate and determine if a provider’s
conduct or ability to deliver care warrants action against the
provider’s medical license.”146
139. See supra Part II.C.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131.
The NPDB is an electronic repository administered by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services that collects and releases information on providers
who either have been disciplined by a state licensing board, professional
society, or health care entity, such as a hospital, or have been named in a
medical malpractice settlement or judgment.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-152T, VA HEALTH CARE: ACTIONS NEEDED
TO ENSURE PROVIDER QUALIFICATIONS AND COMPETENCE 1 (2019) (statement of Sharon
M. Silas, Director Health Care before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, and House of Representatives) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
141. Britton, supra note 43, at 546.
142. GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 1-2. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-19-6, VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION: GREATER FOCUS ON
CREDENTIALING NEEDED TO PREVENT DISQUALIFIED PROVIDERS FROM DELIVERING
PATIENT CARE 13 (2019).
143. GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 2.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id.
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Be that as it may, “the VA Office of Inspector General and
the media have reported . . . multiple cases of quality and safety
concerns regarding specific VA providers.”147 The Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) highlighted these concerns, and
the explicit disregard for VA policy, in a 2019 report.
Specifically, the report reviewed 57 out of the 1,664 VA
employees who had an adverse report in the NPDB as of
September 30, 2016.148 In that sample alone, the VA “took action
against some providers with disqualifying information in the
NPDB but overlooked others.”149 One of the overlooked
providers “surrendered [his] license in 2014, while [still]
employed at [the] VA, but was not [terminated] by the VA
medical center until after [the GAO’s] inquiries in 2018.”150
Another provider was “prescribing controlled substances without
appropriate registration” but was not reported to the Drug
Enforcement Administration until after the GAO’s
investigation.151
The GAO “also found that VA medical centers hired or
retained some . . . providers who they acknowledged had
disqualifying adverse information in the NPDB, which is
inconsistent with [VA] policy.”152 For instance, the VA “hired a
provider who had a state license revoked for patient neglect and
substandard care” at the time the provider was hired in 2014.153
Many providers were also not reported to the NPDB or state
licensing boards when their conduct warranted such reporting.
One unreported provider had VA documentation showing that his
“surgical incompetence resulted in numerous repeat surgeries for
veterans.”154 Another provider “was terminated for cause related
to patient abuse after only [two] weeks of work at the facility[,]”
147. Id. (“[R]eport[s] range[d] from providers lacking appropriate qualifications to
poor performance and provider misconduct . . . .”)
148. GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 4 n.9.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 6.
154. Id. at 13 (finding only one of nine providers under the GAO’s review were
reported to the NPDB). Reporting providers to the NPDB prevents “provider[s] who
delivered substandard care at one VA medical center [from] obtain[ing] privileges at another
VA medical center or at hospitals outside of [the] VA’s health care system.” Id. at 14.
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but still went unreported.155 Sadly, the failure to abide by VA
policies leads “to unsafe care and potential harm” for veterans.156
Instead of spending upwards of one hundred million
taxpayer dollars every year to shield these providers, the
government should require VA employees to procure their own
liability insurance. This is an obtainable objective too. Nearly
every medical professional outside of the VA has malpractice
insurance that covers lawsuits brought against them, including
independent contractors to the VA who are not protected by the
FTCA.157 Most states require physicians to have malpractice
insurance anyways, and many hospitals require it as a condition
of granting hospital privileges.158 The only reason the VA does
not require their employees to have traditional malpractice
insurance is because they treat the FTCA as their malpractice
insurance.159 However, no one at the VA pays a premium to have
this “insurance,” it is simply handed to them. The perception of
immunity—especially as advertised—may be incentivizing
doctors who are otherwise unemployable at other institutions
because of their malpractice history to work for the VA.
Requiring every VA provider to apply for and obtain independent
medical malpractice insurance in the future would serve as an
extra screening step for quality care at the VA.
In 2017, Congress passed the VA Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection Act to “remove Federal employees who
undermine the public trust or fail the American people.”160 While
debate is ongoing about whether the Act is successfully
“chang[ing] the culture at the VA for the better[,]”161 scandalous

155. Id. at 13.
156. See id. at 3.
157. See Bal, supra note 116, at 340.
158. See id.; see also Understanding Medical Malpractice Insurance, INS. INFO. INST.,
[https://perma.cc/3AMX-WLWF] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
159. See 20 REASONS, supra note 33, at 27.
160. Alana Abramson, President Donald Trump Just Delivered His First State of the
Union. Read the Full Transcript., TIME (Jan. 30, 2018), [https://perma.cc/5T47-8NMC]; See
also Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of
2017, S. 1094, 115th Cong. (2017).
161. Nicole Ogrysko, Under New Accountability Act, VA Employees Fear One Mistake
Will Cost Them Their Jobs, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 19, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/WUL4-LGFG] (worrying that the Act is causing the wrong individuals to
be terminated).
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stories such as that of Dr. Levy at the Fayetteville VA continue to
shock and upset the public. Not only does the lack of
accountability at the VA physically and psychologically hurt
veterans and their families, it also creates massive distrust within
our nation’s largest healthcare system and tarnishes the reputation
of the many VA employees who do provide quality care to our
veterans.162 Perhaps placing accountability back on the physician
and the institution, rather than the government, will successfully
change the VA’s reputation for the better and ensure veterans
receive the care they deserve.163
V. CONCLUSION
The FTCA significantly disadvantages veterans injured
by medical malpractice at the VA. Not only does the FTCA
require veterans to sue their country instead of the provider
responsible for their harm, but it also reduces access to attorneys,
courts, and damage awards. Removing the FTCA and its
immunity in medical malpractice lawsuits at the VA would create
a nexus between provider conduct and accountability. This can
only benefit the VA’s reputation. Most importantly, it would give
veterans the same legal rights as civilians in medical malpractice
lawsuits. Veterans deserve, at the very least, the same treatment
as civilians, and it is time they are afforded it.

162. See, e.g., Sosa & Fergeson, supra note 1 (The Chief Investigator for the VA noted
that, “[Dr.] Levy’s actions have hurt the ability to hire doctors at the [VA].”); cf. INST. OF
MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (1999) (“Errors also are
costly in terms of loss of trust in the health care system by patients and diminished
satisfaction by both patients and health professionals. . . . Health professionals pay with loss
of morale and frustration at not being able to provide the best care possible. Society bears
the cost of errors as well, in terms of lost worker productivity . . . and lower levels of
population health status.”).
163. Cf. Frakes & Jena, supra note 132, at 158 (“All told, it appears that the relationship
between health care quality and changes in clinical malpractice standards works in an
expansionary direction only. That is, once physicians provide a high level of quality, they
may maintain such practices even when the law may loosen its expectations at a later date.
In contrast, physicians who provide a quality of care that is below what is expected by the
law raise their practice to meet the higher expectations set by the law. Malpractice forces
that alter the legal clinical standard to which physicians are held may therefore be effective
in elevating the quality floor.”).
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Appendix I164
Calendar
Year
2005

Administrative
Payments
$22,473,295.84

Litigative
Payments
$47,636,242.88

$70,109,538.72

2006

$24,340,123.53

$39,586,842.80

$63,926,966.33

2007

$23,057,405.52

$56,788,477.64

$79,845,883.16

2008

$26,518,144.10

$52,624,223.02

$79,142,367.12

2009

$33,414,607.80

$48,385,503.50

$81,800,111.30

2010

$29,562,953.85

$53,599,301.42

$83,162,255.27

2011

$36,417,606.85

$34,975,631.29

$71,393,238.14

2012

$32,145,895.38

$58,922,067.01

$91,067,962.39

2013

$32,787,580.53

$63,740,614.89

$96,528,195.42

2014

$37,099,775.33

$74,219,579.08

$111,319,354.41

2015

$54,613,446.16

$85,004,153.22

$139,617,599.38

2016

$50,499,186.54

$64,865,273.40

$115,364,459.94

2017

$37,102,400.16

$52,791,223.70

$89,893,623.86

2018

$28,143,394.55

$74,237,826.27

$102,381,220.82

2019

$35,385,893.00

$64,945,782.00

$100,331,675.00

2020

$41,175,449.91

$80,412,551.84

$121,588,001.75

164. See Judgment Fund Payment Search, supra note 51.

Total

